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Law: A Century of Progress, 1835-1935. Edited by Allison Reppy. New York: New
York University Press, 1937. 3 vols. Pp. xx, 387, 438, 475. $15.
Two years ago the present reviewer, having the privilege of addressing, as one of its
guests, the American Bar Association at its annual gathering at Boston, took as his
theme the great interest which the history of the development of American law during
the last hundred or hundred and fifty years would present for common lawyers all
over the world; and he called attention to the comparative paucity of the literature
at present available upon this subject. He permits himself to think that it may have
been in consequence of this address that the editor of the University of Chicago Law
Review has now extended to him the further privilege of reviewing in its pages this
imposing work, a work which goes such a long way to fill the gap of which he had
spoken at Boston.
Law: a Century of Progress celebrates the completion of the first hundred years
of the existence of the School of Law of New York University. It is in three volumes,
of which the first is headed "History, Administration, and Procedure" the second
"Public Law and Jurisprudence"; and the third "Private Law." Altogether they
comprise thirty-six articles or chapters, extending to 1,3oo pages, including indexes,
and the very voluminous and valuable notes.
The main theme of the majority of the contributors is, of course, the evolution of
American judicial and statute law, both federal and state, during the hundred years
under review; but a number of writers have gone farther afield for their subject matter.
Thus Mr. Phanor J. Eder, of the New York Bar, contributes a most interesting
article, which few but he could have written, on "Law and Justice in Latin America";
and Herr Walter Simons, former Chief Justice of Germany, writes on "One Hundred
Years of German Law." In view of its world-wide influence and importance, it is somewhat strange that there is no corresponding account of the evolution of French law
during the period. The unceasing process of reciprocal suggestion and imitation between American and English legislators and judges, is, of course, continually adv.erted
to; but the only section specifically devoted to a topic of English law is Professor
Alexander N. Sack's chapter on the history of conflict of laws in England. In this
very valuable and informative paper the writer traces the somewhat slow evolution in England of the idea that a foreign law could properly be applied in a domestic
forum from the primitive canon that a court could only apply its own domestic lawbe it common law, the law merchant, admiralty law, or ecclesiastical law-and that
where a different law appeared applicable to the case, the parties must be sent to the
jurisdiction where that law belonged. But it may be remarked that the process here
described rather ends than begins in 1835.
The only pages exclusively directed to a comparison of English and American law,
at the present stage of their development, is the contribution of Professor Winfield of
Cambridge, in which he examines and criticizes the first two volumes of the "Restatement of the Law of Torts" from the standpoint of a specialist in English tort law.
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The topic of American law in the last hundred years is most widely departed from
by several of the papers in the second volume, where the editor would seem to have
extended to well-known writers a general invitation to discourse on whatever subject
appealed to them. So we have Professor Harold Laski, in a paper entitled "The Crisis
in the Theory of the State," proclaiming high Marxist class-conflict-revolutionary
doctrines-which do not appear, to the present reviewer, to be applicable either to the
history or to the present circumstances of America or England; while Professor Corwin analyzes without benevolence, or much reference to history, the opinions handed
down by the Supreme Court in the Schechter case.
There can be few people who, being equipped with knowledge equal or superior to
that of the contributors, are competent to review this encyclopaedic book as it deserves; and the present writer is not one of them. This being so, the best course, so it
seems, for him to take, is to endeavour to convey to readers of this Review some impression of the pleasure and profit which he has derived from reading it: and that he
can best do by picking out some of the intellectual nuggets which he has encountered.
In the first paper in the book Dean Emeritus Roscoe Pound gives, under the rubric,
"A Hundred Years of American Law," a suggestive survey of the whole field. He
distinguishes three periods-"a creative period down to the Civil War; a period of
systematizing from the Civil War to the end of the century; and a period of reshaping,
destined to be a new creative era, since Igoo." During the second period "questions
of politics came to be thought of as questions of constitutional law. Questions of administration were turned into judicial questions. It was thought that action at law
would suffice for the regulation of public utilities. It was expected that taxpayers'
suits in equity would prevent waste of public funds. It was expected that mandamus
would suffice to hold public officers to their duty." Speaking of the spirit of innovation which has marked the third period, and of the reactions it has excited, he reminds
us that "the appointment of Story as justice of the Supreme Court was received with
indignation by the solid and respectable elements of the society of his day as threatening subversion of law and of authority." America would still like to think that it lives
in Main Street. "We have become big, but we like to picture ourselves as small.
....

Let us not fear bigness."

Mr. Eder, in the paper already referred to, dwells upon the strong spirit of legalism
which the Spanish colonists carried with them to South and Central America, and implanted there; but he points out that in those regions the force of law resides rather in
public opinion than in the legislatures and the law courts; and the result is not wholly
unsatisfactory. The bibliography and notes to this article should prove of great value
to comparative lawyers.
Mr. Vanderbilt's paper on "One Hundred Years of Administrative Law" is noteworthy. Although, as he records, Maitland, so long ago as 1888, had called attention
to the fact that the law of public administration was winning its way to a leading place
in the framework of the law, "it is to American scholars .... that the credit for the
investigation, analysis, and presentation of the principles of administrative law,
simultaneously with their development in actual practice, must go'"-with particular
reference to Goodnow, Freund, and Frankfurter. The inevitable growth of the administrative activities of government is tending to bring in question the doctrine of the
Separation of Powers. "The fact remains that our government to-day is largely a
government of administrative agencies, many of them exercising powers legislative or
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judicial in their nature." This gives rise to two primary questions: that of the extent
to which the legislature may delegate its powers to the executive department; and
that of the extent to which it may endow administrative agencies with judicial powers.
Both in England and in America the problem remains to be solved, how, in an administrative age, to provide the private citizen with adequate remedies against
wrongful governmental action. "This evil cannot persist indefinitely; sooner or later
we will reach the point where the state itself will be obliged to live up to the standards
it imposes on its citizens. When that point is reached, we will have much to learn from
foreign experience with droit administratif."
ProfessorR.W. Millar's contribution on "The Old Regime and the New in Civil Procedure" is one of the most instructive and interesting articles in the book. Reform may
be said to have begun in England with the act of 1832 which prescribed uniformity of
initial process in common-law actions. In America its decisive beginning is marked
by the bold and enlightened New York Code of Procedure of 1848, which established
the principle of the fusion of common law and equity, an example followed in England by the Judicature Act of 1873. Professor Millar makes the interesting remark that
as regards smoothness of working, the English reformers were the more successful, because they faced the fact that as regards substantive law the distinction between legal
and equitable rules could not be abolished, and that "what was really aimed at in
speaking of fusion was the concurrent administration of the two kinds of rules in the
same suit when the circumstances so required." In America "it is not to be disputed
that the constitutional preservation of jury trial as it existed at Common law, with
the statutes passed in pursuance of it, a circumstance constantly militating against
completeness of fusion."
Dean Wigmore, writing on "Jury-Trial Rules of Evidence in the Next Century" is
severe in his criticism of the present state of the corpus of evidence-law, no less than
of its practical application. What the Dean would like to do, at any rate as one step
towards reform, would be to formulate a simplified set of rules "based on experience
of human nature already embodied in the present jury-trial rules," and then to try
them out experimentally in a jury-less court. If they worked in such a court, then
perhaps bench and bar might be willing to use them in jury-trials. Such a code of
simplified rules Dean Wigmore then propounds-devoting eighteen pages to the
topic,-and the result is a most interesting and suggestive collection of maxims, duly
illuminated by ilustrative examples.
Coming to the second volume, the reviewer was particularly impressed by Professor Kocourek's chapter on "The Century of Analytic Jurisprudence since John
Austin." Professor Kocourek refuses to follow the crowd in condemnation of Austin's
logical system. "We believe it is entirely right to say that in substance Austin's
analyses are correct and that he deserves to be accorded the rank of primate in the
field under discussion." His fault was that he failed to discover "the conceptual nature
of the State and of sovereignty."
If the reviewer may interpose a reflection of his own, which he believes to be in line
with Professor Kocurek's philosophy, it is to the effect that much of the confusion
which troubles legal speculation is due to a failure to distinguish between law as a
pure social fact, and law as based (not without solidity) upon wish-beliefs. When the
law is certain, it does not greatly differ in character from a railroad time-table. When
it is uncertain, it rests upon the collective desire that law be invented by such a
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technique as will make it seem to be discovered. An interesting feature of this article
is the high praise given by the author to Henry T. Terry's "Leading Principles of
Anglo-American Law," and to Wesley N. Hohfeld's "Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning."
Professor Kocourek's paper is followed by one by Professor Kelsen on "The Function of the Pure Theory of Law." In the opinion of the reviewer Professor Kelsen is
embarrassed by the fact that the language in which he presumably thinks and writes
is German. The first and most difficult task which a German thinker has to discharge
is to free his mind from the ambiguity of the word "Recht"; whereas the English or
American philosopher is protected by his mother tongue from any danger of confusing
"law" with "right" or "righteous."
The third volume, entitled "Private Law," is even more closely packed than the
preceding two with matter of first-rate value. In the first place we have Professor
Winfield's article, already referred to, on the "Restatement of the Law of Torts."
Among other interesting points, we may notice the writer's remark that the Restatement does not emphasize the distinction (which, in Professor Winfield's view, lies at
the base of the present English law) between (a) negligence as a method of committing
independent torts, and (b) negligence as itself an independent tort.
Dean Leon Green's paper on "One Hundred Years of Tort Law" cannot be passed
by without a tribute. Dean Green bases his review upon the pregnant truth that the
development of tort-law has been effected by the judicial activity of individualizing
specific types of "hurts worthy of governmental protection."
Professor Llewellyn's most illuminating paper, "Through Title to Contract and a
Bit beyond" is devoted to the problems presented by Sale of Goods, with particular
reference to the Uniform Sales Act. Professor Llewellyn's leading criticism is to the
effect that transfer of title furnishes a wholly inadequate clue to the solution of the
problems presented by a sale. "The results [of an exploration of the mercantile phases
of the fieldi indicate that Sales situations are more complex than one would suspect
from reading merely about the Seller, the Buyer and the Goods; but, especially, more
complex than one would suspect from reading merely of Title and Assent." To the
eye of a realist, title is a complex idea, of which the component parts are often to be
found divided between the different parties to a transaction. An appendix to the
article lists a series of suggested amendments to the federal Sales Bill. An English
reviewer cannot read without pleasure Professor Llewellyn's fine, though not uncritical, tribute to the pre-eminence of the late Lord Justice Scrutton as a commercial
judge.
The last paper which the reviewer finds it impossible to omit from specific notice
is Professor Walsh's article on "The Growing Function of Equity in the Development
of the Law." The great interest of this paper is in no small measure due to its explicitly
historical character. "The purpose of this article is to outline the more important
contributions of equity to the development of the common law prior to 1835, the
establishment of equity in the United States, and the more important developments of
equity since that date." Quoting Dean Pound, the writer relates that "the real history of equity in this country begins after the Revolution. One might almost say that
it begins in the second decade of the nineteenth century." Like Professor Millar, Professor Walsh dwells upon the difficulties encountered in many American jurisdictions in bringing about a satisfactory fusion of equity and law. But "the outstanding
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importance of code merger of law and equity lies partly on the fact that reforms in our
legal system arising in equity out of the application of equitable principles in an everwidening stream no longer have to be 'adopted' at law as did the reforms initiated and
established in equity prior to code merger." Some of the more important lines of
progress which have had their origin in equity have been the development of equitable
relief in tort cases, the development of specific performance, the increasing readiness to
relieve against fraud and mistake, and statutes permitting declaratory judgments.
The reviewer is prompted to ask whether the right of action of the third party beneficiary under a contract is so universally established in American jurisdictions that
there is no longer room in this field for the liberalizing influence of equitable doctrines?
In England this question would call for an answer in the negative.
Turning over once again the pages of this fine book, it occurs to the reviewer to
applaud the many pages of notes and references, by which the value of the majority
of the articles is greatly increased; to remark upon the total absence of any allusion to
the law of domestic relations; and to mention two minor errors noticed respecting
English law. Both of these occur in Professor Tooke's excellent contribution on "The
Progress of Local Government, 1836-i936." Owing to the frequency of so-called
private acts regulating and amplifying the powers of cities, municipal organization is
by no means uniform in England. And the statement that "in England women under
thirty years of age may not exercise the franchise" ceased to be true in 1929, under
the Act of the previous year which assimilated the franchise of men and women for
both parliamentary and municipal selection.
SiR MAUnICE SHELDON Amos, K.B.E., K.C.*
The English Business Company after the Bubble Act, i72o-i8o0. By Armand Budington DuBois. New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1938. Pp. xxii, 522. $5.00.
Students of the corporation law have long realized the gross inadequacy of law
reports and statutes as sources of information as to the legal forces actually operating
to control business practice. In the words of Professor Goebel, "There waft into the
courts only occasional gusts in the varied and perpetually changing weather of commercial transactions. A climate cannot be delineated from a jar of captured raindrops.", The present volume, however, represents probably the first successful effort
to unearth materials from which a more adequate picture may be painted. Mr. DuBois
has combed general sources such as periodicals and pamphlets and has struck a rich
vein of material in records of proceedings before administrative officers of the Crown.
But even more effective is his use of minute books and correspondence in the archives
of a score or more of the large companies of the period, and particularly the private
opinions given by counsel. A surprising number of these opinions has been unearthed
in corporate files, at the Inns of Court, and in other private and public archives. As
earthy material for an understanding of law in action, these opinions are surpassed
only by confidential communications of business men to each other. Thus Matthew
Boulton, the associate of James Watt, has left immortal evidence of the appreciation
of one practical advantage of the unincorporated form of organization. In 1788 he
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